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Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of economic crises on firms’ use of
management control mechanisms and on their management of stakeholder relations.
Moreover, the association between stakeholder management and management
control system use is analyzed. In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008/2009,
many firms were faced with severe threats that called for immediate short-term
action to ensure firm survival. However, short-term action like massive cost-cutting
and cash generation often are blamed for going at the expense of long-term health as
key stakeholder relations may be irreversibly harmed. Hence, three interrelated
questions are addressed theoretically and empirically: First, we analyze the impact
of the recent economic crisis on firms’ control strategies. More specifically, we
investigate whether a high crisis impact on firms is associated with a shortening of
reporting cycles, a more interactive use of control-relevant information, restriction
of employee autonomy and a focus on liquidity and cost-cutting. Second, we
examine from the viewpoint of stakeholder theory how firms can make use of active
stakeholder management for crisis management. Third, we explore whether firms
can take short-term measures for ensuring liquidity and cutting costs and at the same
time pursue a stakeholder strategy aiming at the long-term survival of the firm.
Using survey data from 204 major Austrian corporations, we provide evidence that
firms significantly adjusted their control systems as a response to the economic
crisis. Our data do not indicate an immanent contradiction between a ‘‘short-term
finance focus’’ and the pursuit of a sustainable stakeholder strategy.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008/2009, many firms were faced with severe
threats that called for immediate action to ensure firm survival. When choosing the
measures to cope with this crisis situation, responsible decision makers were
confronted with the challenge to manage the trade-off between the benefits and costs
of short-term crisis reactions (Rhodes and Stelter 2009). On the one hand, short-
term action like massive cost-cutting, cash generation, shorter reporting cycles,
increased employee monitoring and tight budget control seemed necessary to cope
with a decline in orders and revenues and to ensure an appropriate and well-
coordinated response to changed environmental conditions. On the other hand, such
short-term measures might damage the long-term growth potential and go at the
expense of the long-term health of the firm as key stakeholder relations may be
irreversibly harmed.
Hence, the recent economic crisis has intensified the debate on whether and how
it is possible to harmonize shareholders’ demand for profitability (also in the short
run) with the concerns of other stakeholders, including society and the environment
(Sundin et al. 2010). Although the importance of incorporating stakeholder concerns
into management accounting systems has been acknowledged (e.g. Nixon and Burns
2005), there seems to be relatively little progress on how this can be accomplished
(Malmi and Granlund 2009). Existing research in management accounting has
mainly dealt with the measurement of stakeholder-related information. Account-
ability aspects of stakeholder management like environmental and social reports,
sustainability reports and international standards, such as the sustainability reporting
guidelines, have been discussed. Performance measurement systems like the
balanced scorecard (BSC) have extended the traditional financial focus of
performance management systems to also include nonfinancial and stakeholder
related measures (Perrini and Tencati 2006; Speckbacher et al. 2003).
However, there is a lack of research in management accounting that goes beyond
performance measurement and accountability aspects of stakeholder management
and, in particular, there is a lack of research on how stakeholder management
systems relate to management control systems and how both systems might be
integrated.
Management control can be defined as the set of mechanisms designed and
implemented by top management in order to influence and control the behaviour of
subordinate managers and employees to better attain organizational goals (e.g.
Merchant and Van der Stede 2007; Malmi and Brown 2008). As far as
organizational goals are not restricted to shareholder interests but also include
stakeholder concerns, management control systems obviously need to take account
of such stakeholders. Even firms that subscribe to shareholder value maximization
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as their ultimate goal need to actively manage stakeholder relations, as the
generation of shareholder value depends on the contribution of key stakeholders like
customers, employees and suppliers (e.g. Freeman and Gilbert 1987; Jones 1995;
Mitchell et al. 1997). However, stakeholder relationships are not only the basis for
firm value generation, they are also important for managing the distribution of value
and the allocation of risks. The explicit and implicit contracts that a firm negotiates
with its stakeholders specify what the firm expects from its stakeholders (defining
each stakeholder’s contribution to value generation) and what each stakeholder can
expect from the firm in return for his/her cooperation (Atkinson et al. 1997). Since
important parts of these contractual relationships are not written down in explicit
form, this leaves considerable scope for firms deciding on the degree to which
stakeholder expectations are fulfilled. In particular, in times of financial pressure
and unfavourable environmental conditions, a firm’s management has the oppor-
tunity to improve short-term financial results at the expense of stakeholders’ implicit
claims and to shift financial risks from shareholders to other stakeholders. While
there are obvious positive short-term effects in terms of cost reduction and cash
generation, the negative long-term effects are often less visible but not necessarily
less important (Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Speckbacher and Wentges 2010).
Theoretical insights and empirical evidence on how management can deal with
this trade-off between short-term benefits and long-term costs of such measures in
times of high pressure due to economic crises seem to be missing. In particular,
extant research lacks insights into how companies adapt their management control
systems as a response to crisis situations (Hopwood 2009). More generally, there is
scant evidence on the interrelationship between stakeholder management and
management controls (Chenhall 2003). By providing decision-relevant information
and guiding employee behavior with regards to the management of stakeholder
relations, management control systems obviously play an important role for
managing stakeholder relations, particularly in crisis situations.
In this paper three interrelated questions are analyzed theoretically and
empirically: First, we analyze the impact of the recent economic crisis on firms’
control strategies. Building on extant literature on firms’ reactions in crisis
situations, we analyze whether firms that were severely affected by the economic
crisis seek for an increased frequency of control-relevant information, focus on the
interactive use of control-relevant information, restrict employee autonomy and
focus on liquidity and cost-cutting. Second, we examine from the perspective of
stakeholder theory how firms can cope with (external) economic crises using active
stakeholder management to ensure firm survival and continued value generation.
Third, we explore whether certain ‘‘control strategies’’ are associated with certain
‘‘stakeholder policies’’. In particular, we analyze whether firms’ focus on liquidity
and cost-cutting in times of crisis is compatible with a sustainable stakeholder
strategy or not.
For our empirical analysis we use survey data from 204 major Austrian
corporations. Our empirical results indicate that in times of crisis firms significantly
adjust their management control mechanisms in the predicted way but, at the same
time, focus on sustainable relations with both internal and external stakeholders.
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Most interestingly, there seems to be no contradiction between the emphasis placed
on control mechanisms and the pursuit of a sustainable stakeholder strategy.
2 Crisis reactions from a management control perspective
Effective crisis management hinges on precise and quick implementation of
decisions (Smart and Vertinsky 1977). Increasing the frequency of data reporting
helps firms to react faster and more flexibly to new situations and circumstances
triggered by external crisis (Davila et al. 2009). From an informational perspective,
Galbraith (1973) describes management controls as a means to bridge the gap
between information needs and actually available information for decision-making.
Crisis situations are characterized by immediate and unexpected changes of the
environment (Pearson and Clair 1998) and, therefore, quick feedback to decision
makers on changes in the environment becomes vital to enable them to take
corrective action if necessary (Smart and Vertinsky 1977).
Lower-level employees are often closer to the market and shortened reporting
cycles can ensure that top management can make use of up-to-date information that
is available to subordinated organizational units and lower-level employees. The
increased importance of the current availability of relevant information in crisis
situations is underscored also by Ezzamel and Bourn (1990). Thus, we expect firms
that are severely impacted by economic crises to have an increased need for up-to-
date data and shortening their reporting cycles.
H1a Crisis impact is positively related to the shortening of reporting cycles.
Occurrence of an external crisis can not only be expected to have an impact on
the need for up-to-date data but also on data usage and interpretation. Accounting
data can be used in different ways, as is pointed out by several authors. Simons
(1995) distinguishes two ways of how to use accounting information: interactively
and diagnostically. Whereas a diagnostic use of accounting data is characterized by
the cybernetic control principle of monitoring results, the interactive use of data is a
future-orientated way of interpreting and discussing accounting information.
Assumptions are frequently challenged and developments in the external environ-
ment and within the organization are continually monitored and coordinated. These
discussions are intended to not only improve coordination but also information-
sharing among employees in different departments, as well as individual and
organizational learning.
Since crisis situations are typically characterized by an increased need for
information-sharing and coordination across different hierarchy levels as well as
across organizational units (Pearson and Clair 1998), it can be expected that the
demand for interactive use of accounting data is higher in times of crisis. Moreover,
when environmental conditions change rapidly due to the occurrence of an external
crisis, fast organizational learning about adequate reactions to changed conditions
becomes vital.
By intensifying deviation analysis, encouraging discussion about deviations and
by striving for increased communication among organizational units, firms can
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improve immediate mutual adjustment among organizational units, improve swift
coordination in face of a fast-changing environment and improve individual and
organizational learning (Simons 1995). As a consequence, we expect firms that are
severely impacted by economic crises to make more interactive use of control-
relevant information.
H1b Crisis impact is positively related to interactive use of control-relevant
information.
Besides the proposed implications on the demand for information and on
information usage, crisis situations can also influence the extent to which decision
rights are delegated.
The restriction of employee autonomy is one of the most direct forms of ensuring
that employees act in the best interest of the organization (Merchant and Van der
Stede 2007). High unpredictability of the environment in times of crisis makes the
measurement of the outcomes of delegated tasks particularly difficult. This provides
more room for opportunistic employee behavior (Merchant 1990). Moreover, agents
who are not able to achieve targets because of unfavorable environmental conditions
may be de-motivated. In such situations, agents may also feel inclined to take
excessive risks in order to reach their targets despite unfavorable conditions. Hence,
during crisis situations, there is a tendency to place constraints on the behavior of
employees and to restrict their autonomy (Hermann 1963).
H1c Crisis impact is positively related to employee autonomy restriction.
Crisis situations are typically characterized by a high pressure on decision-makers
and a severe threat to firm survival (Pearson and Clair 1998). Most importantly, in
times of crisis firm survival is threatened by financial distress and when revenues
become more uncertain, preserving liquidity and radically adjusting cost levels to
changing demand levels becomes crucial (Hopwood 2009). According to Mu¨ller
(1985), effective crisis management needs to put a focus on cost-cutting, budget-
cutting and liquidity protection. In a similar vein, Rhodes and Stelter (2009) point out
the protection of financial fundamentals as an effective strategy for reducing a firm’s
exposure to negative crisis effects. Since incentive systems are not only important in
motivating employees to making a greater effort but also quite effective for
communicating ‘‘what really counts’’ (e.g. Merchant and Van der Stede 2007), the
increased focus on liquidity and cash-related goals, as well as on cost-cutting, may also
be reflected in an increased use of cash and cost-related measures for incentive
compensation (Gilson and Vetsuypens 1993; Ittner et al. 1997). Hence, we expect firms
that are severely impacted by economic crises to focus on liquidity and cost-cutting.
H1d Crisis impact is positively related to a focus on liquidity and cost-cutting.
3 A stakeholder perspective on crisis management
It has been argued that an active management of stakeholder relations is especially
important during times of crisis (Pearson and Mitroff 1993; Pearson and Clair
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1998). Crisis management is even characterized as a ‘‘systematic attempt by
organizational members with external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively
manage those that do occur’’ (Pearson and Clair 1998).
According to stakeholder theory, stakeholder relationships are the basis for value
generation and the explicit and implicit contractual relationships of the firm with its
stakeholders specify what the firm expects from its stakeholders and what
stakeholders expect from the firm (e.g. Freeman and Gilbert 1987; Jones 1995;
Mitchell et al. 1997; Atkinson et al. 1997). In times of crisis these relationships are
severely affected and continued support of stakeholders has to be ensured to warrant
firm survival. This will require considerate renegotiations of explicit and implicit
contracts focussing on the continued balance between the contributions and benefits
for each stakeholder to ensure long-term cooperation. Increased communication
with stakeholders can help to preserve trust even when the terms of cooperation
need to be adjusted and stakeholders have to bear part of the negative effects of
crises. Ritchie (2004) emphasizes the necessity of understanding the needs of and
cooperating with both internal (employees) and external (e.g. customers, providers
of finance capital, suppliers) stakeholders to manage crisis situations.
Pearson and Mitroff (1993) have developed a framework for effective crisis
management which describes stakeholder management as a major component. The
role of stakeholders during crises is described as twofold: Firstly, they might help an
organization to cope with negative crisis effects and, secondly, in doing so they
themselves are negatively affected. In order to reap the benefits of stakeholder
support during crises it is of vital importance to disseminate information quickly,
accurately, directly and candidly to critical stakeholders (Pearson and Clair 1998).
Similarly, Ulmer (2001) stresses the importance of intense stakeholder relationships
to resolve organizational crises.
Taken together, from the viewpoint of stakeholder theory firms that are severely
impacted by an economic crisis can be expected to intensify communication and
coordinated action with both internal and external stakeholders to find a sustainable
way of sharing risks and other burdens caused by the changed environmental
conditions during an economic crisis.
H2 Crisis impact is positively associated with emphasis placed on sustainable
relations with external stakeholders and with employees.
4 Short-term finance focus and the long-term health of the firm in times
of crisis
While stakeholder theory points out the need of a long-term oriented stakeholder
management during crisis situations, it seems questionable whether such long-term
orientation is in fact compatible with the pressure on firms to focus on liquidity and
to cut costs in crisis situations. When management control focuses on easily
quantifiable financial measures in the face of a crisis, the multidimensional nature of
performance may be neglected. There may be a tendency of over-quantification and
thus dimensions that are usually difficult to measure, such as the sustainability of
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stakeholder relations, are neglected or at least underrepresented in the controlling
process (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). The well-known adage ‘‘What you
measure is what you get’’ indicates the problem that employees tend to focus on
issues that get measured and rewarded even if they know that their actions are
detrimental to the organization (Kaplan and Norton 1996).
Another problem of management control deals with gamesmanship. As Merchant
and Van der Stede (2007) point out, employees often take actions that improve their
own performance at the expense of long-term stakeholder relations of the
organization. A typical example would be the dysfunctional effects of incentive
systems. In an attempt to reach his quarterly sales target, a salesman might be
inclined to sell a lower quality product to customers. In the short run, this results in a
benefit for the salesman and the company; however, in the long run the customer
relation might be put at risk or even irreversibly harmed. This example illustrates
that there might be a trade-off between the emphasis placed on short-term financial
measures and the pursuit of a sustainable stakeholder strategy (long-term customer
relation).
From the viewpoint of stakeholder theory, the implicit nature of contractual
relationships between the firm and its stakeholders bears the potential for firms to
improve short-term financial results at the expense of stakeholders’ implicit claims
in times of financial pressure and unfavourable environmental conditions. By such
active (short-term) management of stakeholder relations, firm risk may be shifted
from shareholders to stakeholders and such a shift may cause severe negative long-
term effects on organizational capital (Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Speckbacher and
Wentges 2010).
On the other hand, also financial measures provide relevant information that
might enable organizations to make decisions for ensuring the long-term survival of
the firm and to learn about how the pressures and burdens arising from external
crises can be fairly divided among all stakeholders, eventually enabling win–win-
situations. An example would be to grant more favorable terms of payment to key
customers in times of crisis in order not to accelerate their insolvency. Just the same,
employees may accept lower effective wages in order to cut production costs and
prevent layoffs in the longer run. As this indulgence towards external stakeholders
can cause higher short-term risk for the firm and financial effects need to be closely
monitored, it might be sensible to even increase the monitoring of financial effects
in order to collect and provide current decision-relevant information that helps to
manage the stakeholder-related risks appropriately.
Hence, stakeholder theory seems to suggest that a higher focus on cash
management and cost-cutting needs to be accompanied by intensified stakeholder
management activities, including intensified communication and cooperative action.
At the same time, stakeholder theory points at possible conflicts between short-term
financial goals and long-term sustainability of stakeholder relations. When the
pressure on firms for short-term financial results is particularly high, then such firms
might prefer to concentrate on short-term action at the expense of long-term
stakeholder management.
Moreover, in times of external shocks, it is quite unlikely that firms immediately
adjust activities ‘‘optimally’’ to changed contingencies. Ferreira and Otley (2010)
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make the important point that there may be good reason why there is often no
optimum fit between firms’ choices of management control systems and the
particular contingencies, at least when contingencies change rapidly. Therefore, we
chose to explore empirically whether firms in fact take short-term measures for
ensuring liquidity and cutting costs and at the same time pursue a stakeholder
strategy aiming at the long-term survival of the firm. Figure 1 displays the
conceptual model for this paper and summarizes the hypotheses.
5 Research design
5.1 Sample
The sample for this study is based on the 700 largest Austrian companies by revenue
according to the AMADEUS database. Financial institutions as well as companies
with less than 30 employees were excluded from the population, which reduced the
sample size to 678 companies. The reasons for the exclusion of financial institutions
are twofold. First, we addressed CFOs as target persons for our survey. The role of
CFOs in financial institutions, however, is not comparable to other industries.
Second, the inclusion of the financial industry would have led to a hardly
controllable time-lag problem. The finance industry had been affected by the current
crisis several months before the other industries and this would have reduced the
comparability and subsequently the validity of our findings.
In line with previous surveys (e.g. Widener 2007), we addressed CFOs as target
persons for our online survey as they are knowledgeable about the firm’s control
systems (Widener 2007). Initial contact with the 678 CFOs was established through
the ‘O¨sterreichische Controller-Institut’, which served as a co-sponsoring
Fig. 1 Conceptual model
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organization of this research project. Data collection for this paper was based on the
online tool 2ask (www.2ask.at). The questionnaire was available in both, German
and English. One and two weeks after the initial invitation email, reminder mails
were sent to the non-respondents. Moreover, follow-up calls were made to further
increase the number of respondents. This process resulted in a total of 204 responses
received, which amounts to a response rate of 30.1%. In comparison with other
similar studies and in light of the challenging timing of the survey, this response rate
seems to be quite satisfactory.
As Table 1 points out, the majority of respondents are CFOs of companies in the
production sector (ca. 43%). Approximately one-third of the survey participants
were from the trade sector while 17% were from the service sector. The remainder
of the responding companies did belong to other sectors. The median turnover of all
companies having returned the survey amounted to 332.5 million euro, while the
median number of employees was 940.
On average, the participating CFOs had been in their current position for
6.5 years. Moreover, the vast majority of CFOs proved to be male (92%) and
reported to be responsible for the risk management agenda of their respective
organizations (83%). The average time to complete the survey was about 35 min.
5.2 Survey design
Before the questionnaire was compiled, 28 qualitative interviews of about an hour
were conducted with representatives of major finance and management accounting
departments of major Austrian companies. The insights gained from this process
helped to get a better understanding of the impact of the crisis on companies and the
issues at stake in the various departments in the typical area of responsibility of a
CFO.
The questionnaire was pre-tested by a small group of academics and three CFOs.
This process resulted in minor changes to some of the wordings and the presentation
of the questionnaire. To improve construct validity the questionnaire contains items
already used in previous studies whenever possible.
5.3 Variable measurement
Data for seven of the nine main variables were collected by our survey instrument:
Data frequency, interactive data usage, autonomy restriction, short-term finance
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the survey respondents (n = 204)
Sector Number
of firms
Percent Median turnover
(in million euro)
Median
employees
Production 87 42.6 360 1,200
Trade 63 30.9 260 480
Services 35 17.2 600 2,360
Other 19 9.3 240 700
Total 204 100.0 332.5 940
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focus, crisis impact, sustainable relations with employees and sustainable relations
with external stakeholders. Each of these constructs was operationalized through 3
to 5 items. As a response format, each item was measured on a seven-point Likert
scale anchored by 1 = does not apply at all and 7 = applies fully. Data for the
remaining two variables industry and size were obtained from the AMADEUS
database.
Items used were adapted from Simons (1995), Henri (2006) and Widener (2007)
as well as from Smart and Vertinsky (1984). In their seminal work on corporate
responses to crises, Smart and Vertinsky (1984) derived several crisis-coping
strategies through a content analysis on seventy corporate case studies that
described the actions of various firms facing crises. The remainder of the items was
specially developed to reflect the specific contingencies CFOs face in economic
crisis situations. A description of variables employed is provided below. The
relevant variables for this study were measured using multiple items that represent
latent variables. Reliability and validity were assessed using factor analysis and
Cronbach a. Manifest indicators for each latent variable were created by averaging
the items for each scale. Each of the variables is discussed in turn.
5.3.1 Crisis impact (CI)
In order to measure the crisis impact companies have to deal with, we purpose-
developed a 5-item construct (revenue decline, margin decline, cash-flow decline,
decline in orders, excess capacities). The survey questionnaire thus contained five
statements, both financial and non-financial in nature (revenues decline, margin
decline, cash-flow decline, decline in orders, excess capacities due to the crisis).
These items were selected in order to incorporate leading, lagging and coincident
indicators for a crisis-related pressure on organizations. These five items together
measure the severity of crisis impact companies face. Factor analysis reveals that
these five items load on the same factor. Additionally, the construct crisis impact
was correlated with a single-item measure that measures the extent to which
companies are negatively affected by the current economic crisis. The analysis
yielded a correlation coefficient close to 1 (0.849), which again underlines our
contention that the measure we have constructed is an appropriate proxy (Cronbach
a = 0.902).
In our study we employ a set of variables that describe the use of control
mechanisms relying on previous literature showing the particular relevance of these
control mechanisms in crisis situations. We assume that the underlying control
mechanisms exist in all companies; however, firms in our sample differ in the use of
these controls.
5.3.2 Data frequency (DF)
Relying on specifications of measures by Smart and Vertinsky (1977) and Ritchie
(2004), we employ four items referring to the shortening of reporting intervals, the
faster and more frequent reporting of deviations from pre-defined target values, the
shortening of the operational planning horizon and the more frequent analysis of
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the economic situation of customers to discover dangerous developments in the
client’s business as soon as possible (Cronbach a = 0.773).
5.3.3 Interactive data usage (IDU)
Building on Ezzamel and Bourn (1990) and Smart and Vertinsky (1977), we used
items that measure the interaction going on among employees during the decision
process. The three items used concern increased discussions of deviations from pre-
set performance targets, the coordination among the different departments that are
involved in the working capital process and the questioning and a more critical
discussion of premises for projects with the employees in charge (Cronbach
a = 0.714).
5.3.4 Autonomy restriction (AR)
In line with Hermann (1963), we used items that measure the degree of autonomy
restriction employees are confronted with. The three items used cover the pressure
on employees with bad performance, the increased use of a top-down leadership
style through target setting and the definition of clear guidelines and the use of
codes of conduct for employees with regard to risk-taking behavior (Cronbach
a = 0.772).
5.3.5 Short-term finance focus (STFF)
Our variable measures draw on Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), Ittner et al. (1997),
Mu¨ller (1985) and Rhodes and Stelter (2009).The five items used comprise a
stronger orientation towards liquidity and cash-flow measures relevant for employee
target setting, cutting cost budgets across the company, the use of restructuring
initiatives to increase the process efficiency and to lower costs, cutting R&D
expenditures and cutting investment budgets (Cronbach a = 0.718).
Due to the lack of appropriate measures in the existing literature, our measures of
stakeholder variables have been specially developed for the purpose.
5.3.6 Sustainable relations with employees (SRWEMPLOY)
The extent to which companies engage in sustainable relations with their employees
was measured using three items: the introduction of short-time work, increased
cooperation with union representatives to boost efficiency and the retention of as
many employees as possible through socially acceptable measures (Cronbach
a = 0.738).
5.3.7 Sustainable relations with external stakeholders (SRWESTAKE)
The extent to which companies invest in sustainable relations with external
stakeholders was measured using five items: more intense and more active
communication with investors, paying attention not to harm the relationship with
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important business partners through short-term optimization measures, acknowl-
edging and making allowances to business partners that are severely hit by the
economic crisis, and intensifying key account management to foster mutual trust
and an increased cooperation with special interest groups (labor unions, Austrian
chamber of commerce, etc.) (Cronbach a = 0.698).
Our study also includes two control variables that have been operationalized
building on measures from previous research.
5.3.8 Organizational size (SIZE)
In accordance with previous contingency-based research, organizational size was
included (e.g. Chapman 1998; Chenhall 2003). Two different measures for size have
been employed, namely the number of employees and turnover. According to Libby
and Waterhouse (1996), size has been measured most often in the past as the natural
logarithm of the number of employees of the company. Hence, in this study size is
measured accordingly.
5.3.9 Industry (IND)
Industry affiliation is included as a second control variable in this study, as was the
case in most previous contingency studies (e.g. Chapman 1998; Chenhall 2003).
Controlling for industry effects seems to be especially important since the current
economic crisis seems to have different effects on companies with regards to timing
and severity in the various sectors. We distinguished between trade, production,
service and other industries, while financial institutions were excluded from the
target population.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 depicts the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The values for the
Cronbach a for the main variables are all above the recommended level of 0.60
(Nunnally 1967). The factor loadings for all variables are all above the
recommended level of 0.40 (Onsi 1973).
For the purpose of enhancing internal validity, late response bias was tested by
halving the samples and running ANOVA to test for differences in means in
selected questionnaire items (see Table 3).
Moreover, non-response bias was assessed performing ANOVA to test for
differences in demographic characteristics between participants and non-partici-
pants in terms of organizational size (number of employees and revenue). In both
cases, no significant differences were found.
Table 4 shows the results for the correlation analysis for the variables used in this
paper.
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6.2 Regression model and results for hypotheses 1a–d
Since a selection-fit approach to contingency-based MCS research is followed in
this paper, regression analysis is employed to test the propositions (Hoque 2006).
Using the OLS-regression technique allows establishing that a set of independent
variables explains a proportion of the variance in a dependent variable at a
significant level (through a significance test of R2).
Multiple regression analysis is run for the various controls and sustainable
relations with both, employees and external stakeholders using crisis impact,
organizational size and industry affiliation as independent variables in each
regression.
Use of management controls
¼ f crisis impact; organizational size; industry affiliationð Þ
Table 2 Descriptive statistics—overview of main variables (n = 204)
Variable Variable description No. of
items
Cronbach
a
Mean SD Theoretical
range
Actual
range
1. CI Crisis impact 5 0.902 4.156 1.524 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
2. DF Data frequency 4 0.773 3.868 1.588 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
3. IDU Interactive data usage 3 0.714 4.768 1.449 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
4. AR Autonomy restriction 3 0.772 4.672 1.414 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
5. STFF Short-term finance
focus
5 0.718 4.239 1.306 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
6. SRWEMPLOY Sustainable relations
with employees
3 0.738 3.507 1.786 1.00–7.00 1.00–7.00
7. SRWESTAKE Sustainable relations
with external
stakeholders
5 0.698 4.203 1.148 1.00–7.00 1.00–6.40
Table 3 ANOVA-results of tests for early-late response bias
Non-response bias
Variable F P
1. CI 0.083 0.774
2. DF 0.799 0.374
3. IDU 0.063 0.802
4. AR 1.123 0.292
5. STFF 1.209 0.274
6. SRWEMPLOY 1.501 0.224
7. SRWESTAKE 0.518 0.473
8. SIZE 0.030 0.863
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Sustainable relations with stakeholders
¼ f crisis impact; organizational size; industry affiliationð Þ
Hypotheses 1a–d and 2 were tested using OLS regression analysis. The results
indicate that crisis impact drives the use of controls (see Table 5). The more
companies face negative crisis effects, the more intensively they make use of the
various controls.
Hypothesis 1a predicted a positive relationship between crisis impact and the
shortening of reporting cycles. This prediction is supported by the analysis of our
data. The results show a positive and highly significant effect of crisis impact on the
emphasis placed on data frequency.
The results of regression analysis are also in line with the direction of the effect
of crisis impact on the interactive use of control-relevant information predicted in
hypothesis 1b. The regression coefficient is positive and highly significant, thus
underlining the prediction that companies facing more negative crisis effects place
more emphasis on the interactive use of data. Additionally, organizational size
yields a positive and highly significant effect on interactive data usage.
In Hypothesis 1c, a positive relation between autonomy restriction and crisis
impact is expected. Again, data analysis confirms our prediction by revealing a
positive and highly significant regression coefficient. As companies face more crisis
pressure, they increasingly ‘‘tighten their strings’’. What is more, controlling for
organizational size yields a weakly positive effect at the 10% level.
The results also confirm hypothesis 1d, which predicts a positive effect of crisis
impact on the focus on liquidity and cost cutting. The more severely companies are
Table 4 Correlation matrix (n = 204)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. CI 1.000
Prob (T)
2. DF 0.405*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000
3. IDU 0.318*** 0.599*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000
4. STFF 0.533*** 0.464*** 0.576*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000
5. AR 0.242*** 0.493*** 0.626*** 0.580*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6. SRWEMPLOY 0.571*** 0.424*** 0.451*** 0.570*** 0.383*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.313*** 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.381*** 0.420*** 0.428*** 1.000
7. SRWESTAKE Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.204*** 0.033 0.232*** 0.217*** 0.155** 0.256** 0.105 1.000
8. SIZE Prob (T) 0.003 0.642 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.000 0.136
*10% confidence level. **5% confidence level. ***1% confidence level
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affected by the crisis the more they rely on a short-term financially driven
orientation to ensure their short-term survival. Moreover, controlling for organi-
zational size shows a weak positive effect at the 10% level.
6.3 Results for hypotheses 2
OLS regression analysis yields a highly significant and positive effect of crisis
impact on sustainable relations with both employees and external stakeholders.
With regards to external stakeholders, the results show that the more severely
companies are affected by the current economic crisis, the more they invest in
sustainable relations with external stakeholders. These results are not affected by
organizational size and industry affiliation.
Concerning sustainable relations with employees, our results indicate that the
more severe the crisis impact, the more emphasis organizations place on sustainable
relations with their employees. Moreover, organizational size has a weakly positive
effect on sustainable relations with employees at the 10% level. Controlling for
industry affiliation, our results show that companies in the trade, service and other
industries place less emphasis on sustainable relations with employees than firms in
the production sector.
Moreover, the predictor variables were tested for multicollinearity issues. Since
the variance inflation factor (VIF) did not exceed (1.484), multicollinearity does not
seem to pose a threat to the validity of our results (Menard 1995).
Table 5 Results of regression analysis (n = 204)
Dependent
variable
DF IDU STFF AR SRWEMPLOY SRWESTAKE Variance
inflation
factor
(VIF)
Intercept 2.310*** 2.641*** 1.974*** 2.963*** 0.890 2.941***
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.000
CI 0.421*** 0.269*** 0.491*** 0.234*** 0.460*** 0.296*** 1.188
Prob (T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
SIZE -0.037 0.187*** 0.107* 0.123* 0.114* 0.042 1.142
Prob (T) 0.589 0.009 0.092 0.094 0.054 0.557
IND Trade 0.027 -0.021 -0.054 0.050 -0.239*** -0.021 1.484
Prob (T) 0.730 0.798 0.459 0.549 0.000 0.794
Services -0.043 -0.102 -0.051 0.000 -0.185*** -0.032 1.201
Prob (T) 0.545 0.159 0.435 0.999 0.002 0.663
Others -0.002 -0.087 -0.059 -0.014 -0.146** -0.067 1.128
Prob (T) 0.976 0.213 0.347 0.846 0.013 0.350
R2 17% 14.4% 30.1% 7.3% 40.1% 10.4%
Adj. R2 14.9% 12.2% 28.4% 4.9% 38.5% 8.2%
N 204 204 204 204 204 204
As a rule of thumb, the variance inflation factor (VIF) should not exceed five for multicollinearity not to pose a
problem (Menard 1995). Production industry serves as baseline for other industry dummy variables
* 10% confidence level. ** 5% confidence level. *** 1% confidence level
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Looking at the explanatory power of both stakeholder models, it is obvious that
the model for sustainable relations with employees is more strongly supported by
our data (adjusted R2 = 38.5%) than the model for relations with external
stakeholders (adjusted R2 = 8.2%). The fact that negative crisis effects explain
more of the variance within the internal stakeholder model than is the case for the
external stakeholder model might be due to the fact that sustainable relations with
external stakeholders may be determined by a broader set of factors.
6.4 Results for association between short-term finance focus and stakeholder
management
In order to explore the nature of this relationship in highly crisis-affected
organizations, we used a two-step approach. In the first stage, we use a two-step
cluster analysis to find clusters that differ with respect to the mean crisis impact. In
doing so, the analysis reveals two clusters. The first cluster derived is characterized
by a high crisis impact (5.53). The second cluster includes companies only
marginally affected by the recent economic crisis (2.96).
In step two of our analysis, we run a correlation analysis for the emphasis placed
on sustainable relations with stakeholders and the short-term focus on liquidity and
cost-cutting for the highly crisis-impacted cluster in order to shed light on the nature
of the relationship between these three variables.
The correlation analysis (Table 6) yields consistently positive correlation
coefficients which are all highly significant. These results provide initial evidence
that there seems to be no contradiction between a company’s focus on a short-term
crisis-related cost and liquidity management and its stakeholder approach in severe
crisis situations. This indicates that even severely crisis-impacted companies are
extremely cautious not to harm their relationships with stakeholders while taking
necessary crisis response measures.
With regards to sustainable employee relationship management, our correlation
results indicate that companies that are highly affected by the recent crisis (n = 95)
seem to be able to reconcile sustainable relations with their employees while
tightening their short-term finance focus (q = 0.572***).
Concerning a sustainable orientation towards external stakeholders, our corre-
lation results are highly significant and positive. Short-term finance focus
(q = 0.316***) shows a strong association with the emphasis placed on a
sustainable orientation towards external stakeholders.
These findings seem to demonstrate that highly crisis-affected firms do follow a
sustainable stakeholder-relations approach mostly independently of their focus on
liquidity and cost cutting measures.
7 Discussion and conclusions
Our study provides evidence on the impact of the recent economic crisis on
management control systems and on stakeholder management activities. Using
survey data from 204 major Austrian corporations, our empirical findings indicate
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that firms acknowledge the need to adjust their management control systems to the
new challenges arising from the occurrence of economic crises. Not unexpectedly,
firms that are put under severe pressure by an economic crisis need to focus on
financials to support and monitor cash management as well as on cost-cutting
activities and such firms seek for more up-to-date information by shortening their
reporting cycles. Interestingly, financial leaders also seem to adjust their leadership
style in exerting control towards employees during crisis situations. On the one hand
firms tighten the reins and restrict the autonomy of their employees; on the other
hand they encourage a more interactive use of control-relevant data, intensifying
discussion with and among employees and challenging the assumptions made.
As suggested by stakeholder theory, firms acknowledge the need to actively
manage their stakeholder relationships in times of pressure to cut costs and preserve
liquidity. Obviously, finance executives do not see an immanent contradiction
between short-term control needs and stakeholder-related activities to enable long-
term stability in times of crisis. Our theoretical deliberations and our empirical
results not only contribute to the literature on management in times of external crisis
but also are an important step towards a more integrated view of management
accounting and stakeholder management.
However, several limitations of our study need to be considered. First, the use of
a limited number of independent variables in the OLS regressions leads to the
problem of causality and the omitted variable problem. Second, the survey-based
instrument is of course subject to the general limitations of this type of research
(Birnberg et al. 1990). The single respondent approach used and the fact that CFO
perceptions are measured needs to be considered when interpreting our results.
Moreover, our study does not include the financial sector, which has played a very
specific role during the recent economic crisis.
With respect to future research, considering performance implications of certain
management control and stakeholder management policies could yield deeper
insight. Also the inclusion of case-based evidence seems quite promising. While
firms tend to complement the increased focus on short-term financials during a crisis
with long-term stakeholder activities, there are firms in our sample that do not. It
might be interesting to analyze the reasons why some firms obviously see a
contradiction between short-term and long-term needs while others do not.
Table 6 Correlation matrix (n = 95)
Variable 1 2 3
1. STFF 1.000
Prob (T)
2. SRWEMPLOY 0.572*** 1.000
Prob (T) 0.000
0.316*** 0.322*** 1.000
3. SRWESTAKE Prob (T) 0.002 0.001
*10% confidence level. **5% confidence level. ***1% confidence level
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